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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 05-2294
________________
A.W., individually and o/b/o S.W.
v.
EAST ORANGE BOARD OF EDUCATION
A.W.,
Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the Order of the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey 
District Court Judge:  Honorable Joseph A. Greenaway
(D. N.J. Civ. No. 04-cv-01565)
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on May 1, 2007
Before: BARRY, CHAGARES and ROTH, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed  September 14, 2007)
_______________________
 OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
A.W., proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey denying her motion for fees and costs under the Individuals
2with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq. (“IDEA”).  We will affirm.
A.W. alleged in her motion for fees and costs that she is the parent of S.W., a
student in the East Orange School District.  After evaluating S.W., the School District
determined that he was ineligible for special education services.  The School District
subsequently told A.W. that S.W. could not attend school unless he was medicated for
hyperactivity.  A.W. retained a consultant to represent her in her effort to obtain special
education services for S.W.  The School District also told the consultant that S.W. was
ineligible for special services, and that he must be medicated before returning to school.
A.W. filed a due process hearing request with the New Jersey Department of
Education to pursue special education services for S.W.  Shortly before a scheduled
mediation, A.W.’s consultant and the School District’s attorney discussed special
education services for S.W.  An Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”) was developed for
S.W. and implemented.
In her motion, A.W. sought to recover $22,725.00 in fees and costs charged by the
consultant for her services.  The District Court denied the motion, and this appeal
followed.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District
Court’s order for an abuse of discretion.  John T. v. The Delaware County Intermediate
Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 551-52 (3d Cir. 2003).
Under the IDEA, the District Court is authorized to award reasonable attorneys’
fees as part of the costs to the parents of a child with a disability who is a prevailing party. 
320 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B); John T., 318 F.3d at 555.  As recognized by the District Court,
a “prevailing party” must be successful in the sense that it has been awarded some relief
by a court.  John T., 318 F.3d at 556 (citing Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v.
West Virginia Dep’t of Health and Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603-04 (2001)).  Although
a party benefitting from a settlement agreement could be a prevailing party, the change in
the legal relationship must be in some way judicially sanctioned.  Id.  We have found a
stipulated settlement judicially sanctioned where it (1) contained mandatory language; (2)
was entitled “Order;” (3) bore the signature of the District Court judge; and (4) provided
for judicial enforcement.  Id. at 558.  See also P.N. v. Clementon Bd. of Educ., 442 F.3d
848, 853-55 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding consent orders were judicially sanctioned).
Under this authority, A.W. is not a prevailing party by virtue of having obtained an
acceptable IEP.  John T., 318 F.3d at 560.  As in John T., A.W. and the School District
developed the IEP through negotiations out of court, and no court has endorsed the
agreement with a judicial imprimatur.  Id.  Thus, the District Court did not err in denying
A.W.’s motion.
Moreover, even if A.W. could be considered a prevailing party, the fee-shifting
provision does not authorize a prevailing parent to recover fees for services rendered by
an expert educational consultant in IDEA proceedings.  Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2457-58 (2006).  The fee-shifting provision authorizes
the recovery of reasonable attorneys’ fees and other enumerated costs.  Id. at 2460. 
4A.W.’s consultant was not an attorney.       
Accordingly, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
